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1Only twenty years after the landmark Asilomar meeting where scientists dis-
cussed the opportunities and possible risks presented by the ability to transfer
DNA from one organism to another,' bioengineered products have moved out-
side the connes of the laboratory into commercial uses in the pharmaceutical
and food-processing industries. Recent advances in molecular biology and the
application of new technologies to the production of food have opened the door
to a new world of bioengineered food. Agricultural biotechnology2 has the po-
tential to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population and minimize the
toxic inuences of traditional farming practices on the environment.3 Further-
more, it promises to improve human nutritional intake and can even aim to
satisfy our desire for novel or exotic foods with aesthetically appealing textures,
appearances and tastes. At the same time, however, the public remains
1Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules,
188 SCENCE 991 (1975) . The Asilomar meeting has been recognized as
the beginning of public oversight, rather than mere scientic debate, over
recombinant DNA experimentation. See generally Judith P. Swazey et al.,
Risks and Benets, Rights and
Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research
Controversy, 51 5. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978).
2For purposes of this paper, the terms biotechnology and a genetic engineering
refer to the ability to eect specic genetic changes via techniques such as
recombinant DNA (rDNA) (i.e., joining together pieces of DNA from dif-
ferent organisms together in vitro), cell fusion (used to create homogeneous
antibodies that recognize only one kind of antigen), and recombinant RNA
(rRNA) (the newest techniques in which RNA is modied by inserting
segments of foreign RNA). Cf. Diane
E. Homann, The Biotechnology Revolution and its Regulatory
Evolution, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 471 n.l (1988) (employing this de-
nition); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, cO~{ERCIAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, 3| 4, 503 (1984) (adopting sim-
ilar denition)
3council on scientic Aairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, Biotechnology and the Amer-
ican Agricultural Industry, 265 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1429, 1429-34 (1991)
2
2suspicious of the uses to which genetic engineering may be put, as well as some-
what wary of the foods derived from genetically engineered organisms.4 Critics
of the new technology have long argued that recombinant DNA techniques and
products derived from them pose signicant and ill-understood risks to human
health and safety) Against this backdrop, the federal Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) has sought to fulll its statutory mission to protect the safety
and wholesomeness of the food supply) Because the FDA has chosen to address
the novel issues raised by the application of biotechnology to food through ex-
isting statutory authority, manufacturers and producers of bioengineered food,
as well as others concerned with the availability of safe, nutritious and inexpen-
sive food, have sought clarication from the FDA about how these decades-old
standards will be applied. In the near-term future at least, the FDA'S response,
published in l992,~ appears likely to direct commercial eorts at bioengineered
foods into channels that may not realize the full benets of
e.g., Michael Schrage, Innovation's Growth Industry Lies
Where High Tech and Low Brow Meet, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1994, at
D2
(observing that Calgene must constantly assure consumers that its
genetically engineered Flavr-Savr tomatoes are not Frankenfoods) 5See,
e.g., Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, 1 ISSUES
SCI. TECH. 19, 21 (1985) (arguing that the risks inherent in biotechnol-
ogy are the greatest people have ever confronted from advances in the nat-
ural sciences); Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, 16 SCIENCES
7 (1976).
6This paper will concentrate primarily on the FDA's regulation of foods and food
additives produced by biotechnology. It will not discuss the FDA's oversight of ge-
netically engineered drugs, nor will it specically address the role of other federal and
state agencies in regulating biotechnology.
257 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992) [hereinafter FDA Statement).
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3biotechnology, both from consumerist and marketing perspectives, as quickly
and eciently as possible.
Part I of this paper briey explains relevant provisions of the federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act8 (FD&C Act) leading up to the analytic framework set
forth by FDA in its 1992 statement of policy. Part II discusses the scientic
and regulatory climate in which Calgene, a manufacturer of a genetically altered
tomato, brought its product to market in consultation with the FDA. Part III
attempts to place the substantial discretion vested in the FDA in a broader
context as part of the ongoing debate about the safety of genetic engineering.
Finally, Part IV explores how the FDA'S positions could inhibit or enhance
the development of an active and ecient market for genetically engineered
products.
I. Basic Statutory Framework of the FD&C Act
Under current federal law, foods and food additives are regulated by the FDA
under the FD&C Act. The Act prohibits the introduction or delivery into
interstate commerce of misbranded or adulterated food. Under x 402(a) (1) of
the Act,
food shall be deemed to be adulterated [i]f it bears or contains any poisonous
or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case
the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered
adulterated under this clause if the
821 U.S.C. x5 301-92 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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4regarding exactly how the FD&C Act's provisions were to be applied to food
produced through these techniques.'7 Conceptually, was genetic engineering to
be treated as a more ecient and targeted form of classical hybrid breeding
procedures, which had not be subject to any greater regulatory scrutiny, or as
the creation and manipulation of organisms in which human intervention had,
by denition, inserted new additives into the ultimate food products?
The FDA'S articulated position regarding the regulation of biotechnology
products as of 1936 did not clarify matters much. After asserting that ex-
isting statutory authority would guide the FDA into the realm of genetically
engineered food, the statement held that the administrative review of products
using biotechnology [would be] based on the intended use of each product on a
case-by-case ~ Experts advised that it was important to evaluate whether new
procedures resulted in changes in the chemical identity of the ingredient, the
introduction into the food supply of new or altered levels of impurities, or an in-
crease in dietary exposure of consumers to the ingredient that was not justied
by available safety data.'9 If the FDA found that the food ingredient manufac-
tured by a new method had been altered signicantly, the agency would either
conclude that
17.see, e.g., Steven W. Frank, Food Additive Models for the Regulation of
Recombinant DNA Technology Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosn~etic
Act, 45 FOoD DRUG COSM. L.J. 169, 171 (1990)
'~51 Fed. Reg. 23,309,
'9See James H. Maryanski, Prospects for the Safety Evaluation of Foods
in the United States of America in Connection with Biotechnology (paper
presented June 9-10, 1988)
7
7the new ingredient was also generally regarded as safe (GRAS) or that it was
not GRAS and was subject to the food additive provisions of x 409 of the FD&C
Act.20 The law did not preclude an ingredient produced by recombinant DNA
techniques, or other novel methods, from being armed as GRAS. However, to
be armed as GRAS, the food ingredient must be shown to meet the criteria
of a GRAS food ingredient, including a wide recognition of safety based largely
on published information concerning the intended use of the ingredient. Fur-
thermore, these experts cautioned that the microbiological review has a pivotal
role in assessing the potential for toxic substances to be present in food as a re-
sult of genetic modications.2' As per the FDA's policy, the food manufacturer
should adequately identify all of the organisms and vectors used to construct
the commercial production strain and characterize fully the introduced genetic
alterations through techniques such as restriction mapping and nucleotide se-
quencing to establish the absence of sequences that may code for harmful or
unexpected substances.22 Information was also needed to assess whether the
production culture produces antibiotics or toxins, and whether the production
culture was pathogenic.
These general guidelines, however, failed to resolve numerous inquiries re-
ceived by FDA on issues such as whether the agency would conduct pre-market
review of new genetically
205ee id.
215ee id.
225ee 51 Fed. Reg. 23309 (1986)
8
8engineered foods, whether and under what conditions such foods would be chal-
lenged by FDA when introduced into interstate commerce, whether special la-
beling would be required for these new foods, and what scientic information
would be necessary to satisfy FDA that such foods were safe and in compliance
with the FD&C Act and other applicable statutes 23
II. Building upon the Framework: The Flavr Savr Tomato
Case and the 1992 Policy Statement
Calgene, one of the larger companies dedicated to the agricultural uses of
biotechnology,24 became the rst producer to request consultation with the FDA
concerning a new plant variety developed by recombinant DNA techniques.2 ~Ba-
sically, there were two parts to Calgene's regulatory concerns with respect to its
Flavr Savr tomato, which contained an antisense gene sequence that allowed the
tomatoes to be picked ripe and then shipped to the consumer without rotting.
In April of 1991, Calgene submitted to the FDA a request for an advisory opin-
ion on the safety of using a common research tool, the kan(r) gene, as a marker
to facilitate the selection of plants which have been successfully transformed
with the desired trait (i.e.,
235ee 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,984 (1992).
24Robert A. Bohrer, Food Products Aected by Biotechnology, 55 U.
PITT. L. REv. 653, 670 (1994).
255ee 57 Fed. Reg. 22,294, 22,985 (1992).
9
9inhibited production of polyglacturonase, the enzyme that causes rotting) ~26
Second, Calgene sought the FDA's advice regarding the safety of adding a non-
coding, anti-sense genetic sequence for the gene that ordinarily produces the
enzyme responsible for degrading the cell walls of ripened tomatoes.27 This
sequence slows the rate of expression of polyglacturonase, the plant enzyme
that causes pectin to degrade, an essential step in the softening of ripe fruit.
The FDA's response to Calgene's requests and the prevailing uncertainty was
embodied in a Statement of Policy issued May 29, l992.~ Basically, the state-
ment creates an analytic framework for new varieties of genetically engineered
food plants that yields one of three possible outcomes: a position of no concern;
an admonition to consult FDA, which could include both informal regulatory
approval as well as the requirement for formal GRAS armation or food addi-
tive review; or a determination that the new variety is not acceptable.29 The
statement then considers four major classes of genetically-induced eects and
the appropriate regulatory treatment for each, which are discussed in greater
detail below.
Briey, one type of bioengineering transformation is to alter the production
levels of a protein endogenous to the plant. Such intra-generic eorts would
include, for
265ee 56 Fed. Reg. 20,004 (1991) (FDA requesting comment on Cal-
gene's request)
275ee 57 Fed. Reg. 22,772 (1992).
2857 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992).
295ee 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,992.
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10example, the Calgene tomato's inhibition of the production of the rotting en-
zyme. These cases present the clearest analogy to traditional hybridization
eorts, albeit in a much more specically targeted fashion. Thus, the FDA in-
dicated that its degree of concern would depend on whether such changes have
an eect on toxicants present in that species and whether the result is a signi-
cant change in the nutritional value of that food)0 Where there are no increases
in toxicant levels or the changes in the overall nutritional value of the food,
the FDA will not require consultation or pre-market approval | a no concern
position.3'
Genetic engineering may also seek to introduce a non-native protein to the
plant in order to confer desirable characteristics from the transferor plant or
animal on the host plant. If the protein does not have a history of safe use in
food and will be found in foods produced from the plant, the FDA will consider
the eect of the new protein on levels of any native toxicants that may exist as
well as the allergenicity and toxicity of the introduced protein.32 Signicantly,
unless the new protein appears on limited lists of known allergenic proteins or
known toxic proteins, the producer of the genetically engineered new variety
may make its own determination that the food is not one that may be harmful
to human health and therefore is generally
305ee 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,993 (Figure 1).
31See id.
325ee id. at 22,999|23,000 (Figure 4).
11
11recognized as safe.33 However, if the new protein without a
safe history of safe food usage is likely to be a
macroconstituent in the human or animal diet, the FDA will
require pre-market consultation and possibly approval as a
food additive.34
The twin questions of GRAS status and macroconstituent treatment are not
trivial to the manufacturer and will likely inuence the types of innovation pur-
sued by food manufacturers. Manufacturers favor GRAS status over the food
additive petition process for several reasons. First, GRAS status allows the
sponsor of an ingredient to decide whether the studies and tests conducted on
the substance justify the conclusion that the substance is GRAS. Second, GRAS
determinations are generally broader than the very narrow uses permitted for
food additives, and subsequent expanded uses of GRAS substances are obtained
more easily. In addition, where the sponsor of an ingredient seeks FDA arma-
tion of its GRAS status, the FDA review process itself is likely to be quicker and
less cumbersome.35 FDA approval of direct food additives, on the other hand,
generally takes between ve and seven years.36
33See id.; see also Bohrer, supra note 24, at 662.
34See 57 Fed. Reg. 23,000 n.17e.
35Bohrer, supra note 24, at 658.
36coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology:
Establishment of the Biotechnology science Coordinating Committee, 50
Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,177 (1985), cited in Karen Goldman Herman, Comment,
Issues in the Regulation of Bioengineered Food, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 107,
124 (1992).
12
12The Statement also propounds two questions regarding changes in or additions
to the carbohydrates found in a plant variety. First, does the resulting car-
bohydrate contain any structural features not ordinarily found on food carbo-
hydrates, and, if the carbohydrate is likely to be a macroconstituent of the
diet, are there any changes that are likely to aect digestibility or nutritional
qualities?37 Although some commentators have noted that the FDA's position
will likely mean that new carbohydrates are treated more stringently than new
proteins,3 ~ it does appear that a genetically engineered carbohydrate similar in
structure, digestibility, and nutritional value will avoid FDA premarket review.
Finally, new or modied fats or oils must be considered under a slightly
dierent framework. For such lipids, the rst question is whether the resulting
fat or oil will be a macroconstituent of the diet.39 If so, then the manufacturer
must consult with the FDA, without regard to whether there are changes in
digestibility or nutritional value. Second, the FDA'S owcharts articulate a
policy decision that if the new or modied lipid is not unusual or toxic, then
the producer can make its own determination of safety and avoid pre-market
review. 40
37See 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,001.
39See Bohrer, supra note 24.
39See 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,003 (Figure 6).
405ee id.
13
13In many cases, therefore, the choice presented to a manufacturer hinges on
whether the FDA will require consultation (and potentially a time-consuming
food additive petition) or whether the manufacturer will be able to make its own
determination of safety based on its own testing, often guided by FDA protocols.
One striking features of the FDA'S analysis is its use of a macroconstituent
threshold (e.g., for proteins, carbohydrates, and lipids) . The FDA will require
pre-market consultation and possibly pre-market approval for a new protein that
is likely to be a macroconstituent in the human diet, even where the protein
is not from a donor species commonly allergenic, is not reported to be toxic,
and is of the type of protein ordinarily well-digested in humans.4' Such concern
may be unwarranted; in this case, the manufacturer would appear to be well-
equipped to make the determination of safety for itself. On the other hand,
as the statement itself indicates, one possible class of proteins that could be
consumed at a substantial level comprises the enzymes used as selectable marker
genes, introduced into many plants.42 Because the introduction of these proteins
may be susceptible to coordination problems among market participants, none
of whom individually may introduce the marker protein in sucient quantities
to warrant concern, it may be appropriate for the FDA to protect consumer
welfare by acting
41See id. at 23,000 n.16; Bohrer, supra note 24, at 663.
425ee 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,000 n.16.
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14the success or failure of the FDA's regulatory scheme and, in turn, the success
or failure of the bioengineered food industries will rest on how the FDA applies
the discretion with which it is vested in allocating resources to the regulation of
genetically engineered food and how it addresses and is aected by the broader
social policies that underlie public concern about genetic engineering.
III. Arguments for and against Genetically Engineered Foods
Beyond the specic statutory provisions of the FD&C Act and the interpre-
tations announced by the FDA, it is important to emphasize FDA's substantial
discretion and the informal nature of the consultation approach adopted by the
FDA. The visibility of the FDA'S actions, which are widely reported on in the
media, make the agency a lightning-rod for the interest groups' and the general
public's criticisms. Thus, genetic engineering's future in food products must be
viewed against the ongoing societal debate over the uses and feared abuses of
bioengineering.
On the one hand, as recently as 1987, nearly a quarter of the American
people harbor moral or religious objections to gene splicing or recombinant DNA
to produce hybrid animals and plants.47 Some people criticize it as playing God
with
47See Food and Drug Admin., Oce of Tech. Assessment, New De-
velopments in Biotechnology: Background Paper | Public Perceptions of
Biotechnology 57 (1987) (24% of Americans who have heard of the tech-
niques say creating hybrids through direct manipulation of DNA is morally
wrong; 68% say it is not morally wrong).
16
16living organisms. Although the objections may have become more muted as the
technology has grown more established, the popular suspicion of recombinant
DNA techniques obviously exerts a powerful hold on Americans' imagination
even today, as demonstrated by the spectacular success of the 1993 movie Juras-
sic Park. Even food experts and scientists are not immune. In response to the
FDA's statement of policy, one thousand of the nation s top chefs vowed to
boycott genetically engineered foods. As one chef explained, I am not willing to
oer my patrons, my family or myself as a testing ground for a new generation
of bioengineered foods.48 The existence of such sentiments, despite the FDA's
conclusions, suggests that genetic engineering may prove to be an issue that
opens up a schism between the FDA and the public, which has long reposed
great condence in the agency.
Many Americans fear that the risks are not well understood or that genet-
ically engineered organisms, either as food or in the environment, may present
unforeseen long-term risks. The 1987 survey mentioned above found that 52%
of the public believes that genetically engineered products are at least somewhat
likely to represent a serious danger to people or the environment.49
485ee Sue Kirchho, Chefs to Boycott Genetically Engineered Food, Reuter
Bus. Rep., July 28, 1992.
49See Food and Drug Admin., Oce of Tech. Assessment, supra note
47.
17
17The introduction of new proteins into foods or novel combinations of proteins in
foods creates the possibility of allergic responses in susceptible individuals. In
the absence of labeling requirements, a person would not be able to know that
possibly allergenic substances had been introduced into the food. Although the
1992 policy statement did not impose a per se requirement of special labeling
on genetically altered foods,50 the FDA has recently requested comments on
whether these foods should be labeled as such.5' Although consumers who de-
mand sucient information upon which to make an informed choice might favor
a label, a useful label that actually identies the types of genetic engineering
(intra-generic versus inter-generic, for example) or the sources of the DNA used
would likely create an extremely complex label that few consumers are likely to
be able to interpret. Moreover, while public fears linger, any label that alludes
to a bioengineered origin may devastate the marketability of the product.52
Finally, religious or ethical dietary proscriptions may prevent some people
from accepting the new technologies. A moral vegetarian would perhaps be
disturbed to learn that an apparent grain product had been genetically altered
with
50Cf. 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,992 (noting that consultation with FDA may
result in special labeling required)
5I~g Fed. Reg. 25,837 (1993).
52Cf. Citing Survey, Monsanto Says Any BST Label Will be
Misleading, Fooo LABELING NEWS, Apr. 4, 1994 (survey comparing
public response to variety of labels found that regardless of the apparent
innocuousness of the label, 87-97% thought milk from cows not treated
with a genetically engineered drug was safer, tastier, or more nutritious
than milk from treated cows)
18
18animal DNA, for instance. Although the number of DNA nucleotides aected by
genetic engineering is innitesimal compared to the total DNA in an organism,
the dietary dictates of Orthodox Judaism or the moral imperatives of veganism
may be dicult to reconcile with these new procedures.
On the other hand, there is no scientic evidence that rDNA alters the toxi-
city, safety, or allergenicity of foods. Proponents of the new technology identify
the many individuals' concerns as stemming from their qualitative assessment
of the risks involved as new, complex, uncontrollable, and involuntary (to the
extent that bioengineered products are not specially labeled) .~ The develop-
ment of plant varieties capable of resisting disease and inhibiting rotting leads
to less wasted food, easier transportation, and a commensurate savings of re-
sources. Biotechnology may be employed to enhance crop yields and nutritional
contents of foods, which may oer the only way to feed a rapidly expanding
world population and to cope with periodic droughts that aict certain regions
of the world.
Although the controversy over genetic engineering may be simplistically
characterized as a debate over the magnitude of the risks and uncertainties
involved, the public acceptance and commercial success of bioengineering food
products depends on how the FDA and the food industries are able to address
the public's concerns. The next section
53See Bohrer, supra note 24.
19
19examines whether and how the FDA should use its institutional prestige and
goodwill with the public to facilitate the marketability of bioengineered foods.
IV. Implications for the Development of a Market
Many commentators have explored the application of traditional FDA reg-
ulatory structures in the biotechnology arena as well as critiqued the adequacy
of this regime to control the emerging new technology. Another approach, how-
ever, is to consider the implications of the existing regulatory framework for
the introduction to market of new food products obtained through genetic en-
gineering techniques. This section examines the signals and incentives that the
FDA's regulatory positions may be establishing for actual and potential market
participants, as they consider to what kinds of innovative food products they
should dedicate their scarce nancial and scientic resources. I argue that the
current regulatory regime may be inhibiting the introduction of certain types
of products that would be likely to nd a receptive public market. Moreover,
the FDA's unwillingness to aggressively counter many of the public's irrational
fears of genetic engineering may reduce the incentives of biotechnology food
manufacturers to invest
54See, e.g., Bohrer, supra note 24; Daniel D. Jones, Food Safety
Aspects of Gene Transfer in Plants and Animals: Pigs, Potatoes,
and




20in bioengineer foods because of the limited economic return achievable.
The FDA's policy statements regarding how the agency intends to regulate
bioengineered food products implicitly favor certain types of relatively conser-
vative tinkering at the expense of arguably more radical, but not necessarily
more dangerous, engineering of food products. In addition to the possibility
that the FDA will nd itself in a continual struggle to keep pace with the accel-
erating rate of scientic and technological breakthroughs, the FDA has outlined
its position with respect to four major categories of possible eects of genetic
engineering that appear to make it more dicult, expensive and time-consuming
for a biotechnology rm to bring a certain types of innovative food product to
market, despite several arguments that would support allowing such products
to be sold.
For example, the obligation to consult the FDA with respect to possible aller-
genics introduced into a product creates the possibility that many rms will de-
cide that the extra developmental costs and risks are not worth the risk. Essen-
tially, the pre-market notication and review process may have an in terrorarn,
chilling eect on the introduction of certain products. For example, although
producers may unquestionably sell properly-labeled peanuts and peanut-based
products on the market, the 1992 Statement does not explicitly adopt a com-
parative risk analysis that would look to making the product available, perhaps
with a simple
21
21warning directed to individuals allergic to peanuts, despite its allergenicity to
certain consumers in the market.
Consumers are likely to respond to genetically engineered foods in a man-
ner dierent from, say, bioengineered drugs. Although the demand for food
generally is probably rather inelastic (after all, one must consume calories and
nutrients, and the purchase of food has a high priority in an individual's budget),
the demand for any particular variety of food product is relatively elastic. The
elasticity of genetically engineered foods is particularly high, given the fact that,
at least for the near future, bioengineered foods will have very close substitutes
in the eyes of most consumers. For example, the Flavr Savr tomato competes in
the market with several ordinary varieties of tomatoes. Contrast the situation
with bioengineered drugs, in which a new product's greater ecacy and reduced
side eects in treating a particular disease or condition may make the drug un-
equaled and consumers' demand for it far less elastic. Thus, the FDA should
be wary of imposing great costs, in the form of regulatory compliance expenses
and delay, on manufacturers who seek to introduce genetically engineered food.
On the other hand, because the scientic research and technical know-how
involved in genetically altering a food source entail substantial costs, the manu-
facturer needs to be able to recoup his expenses by being able to charge a higher
price for the benets of the new product. Calgene's
22
22products, for example, provided improved taste because the tomatoes were vine-
ripened, rather than articially ripened by exposure to ethylene gas; they also
reduced wholesalers' and retailers' losses due to soft tomatoes damaged during
shipment.
Given the FDA's unrivaled visibility among government agencies and its
unique role in safeguarding the food supply, the FDA can facilitate the devel-
opment of the bioengineered food industries by continuing to assure the public
of the safety of these foods. When the Calgene tomato received regulatory ap-
proval, approximately ve years after it was rst created, FDA Commissioner
pronounced the vegetable as safe as any tomato on the market.56 Even as the
Flavr Savr tomato nally begins to enjoy modest regional sales today, however,
Calgene still nds that [m]anaging consumer ignorance becomes more impor-
tant than providing a quality innovation.57 In the short term, industry may
welcome the FDA's case-by-case analysis of the rst bioengineered foods and
the attendant public generated by the process, because FDA approval will help
to assuage the public's concerns about safety and boost public condence in
these products. On the other hand, in the longer term, industry representatives
555ee Bohrer, supra note 24, at 671 (noting dierence in taste).
Of course, the reduction in loss damage would tend to reduce the prices;
however, for many other types of genetic engineering that do not aect
transportation or disease characteristics, such as true avor or nutritional
hybrids, this eect is negligible.
56Long March of the Tomato, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1994, at A22.
57schrage, supra note 4, at D2.
23
23argue that bioengineered foods should require no more screening than tradition-
ally produced foods.58
The issue of labeling genetically engineered foods as such puts market partic-
ipants in a dicult dilemma. On the one hand, voluntary labeling of genetically
engineered products may justify price dierentials over traditional foods. Fur-
thermore, over the long term, it can help to eliminate public concern about these
products by highlighting the genetically altered products' nutritional, aesthetic
and gustatory equality or superiority to their traditionally produced forerunners.
However, the possibility of an unreasoned consumer rejection of genetically en-
gineered foods might prevent any one rm from making the rst move. Thus,
the question becomes whether the FDA should cut through this coordination
problem by imposing a labeling requirement on all producers. If the FDA si-
multaneously uses its public goodwill to disseminate its scientic basis for the
safety of bioengineered foods, it may be able to achieve public acceptance of
such foods and competitive equality (in fact, competition on nutritional and
other merits of the products, rather than on scare tactics) in the marketplace.
As the FDA develops regulatory expertise in the particular applications and
techniques of biotechnology, the costs of bringing a genetically engineered prod-
uct to market
5~See International Food Biotechnology Council, Biotechnologies
and Food: Assuring the Safety of Foods Produced by Genetic Modication,
12 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY xvi, cited in Herman, supra
note 36, at 126.
24
24will likely be reduced. Currently, food manufacturers are likely to hire and
train the top researchers and scientists in genetic engineering. As the technol-
ogy becomes more established and knowledge lters into the agency as it obtains
personnel and experience in these specialized elds, the FDA will perhaps be
able to develop more specic protocols and regulations to announce acceptable
substances and procedures, for example, a better idea of the dietary eects,
if any, of various genetic markers that may be used throughout the industry.
Already, food manufacturers are able to proceed through the FDA notication
and consultation phase more quickly because the FDA has previously dealt with
analogous substances or vectors)9 In turn, manufacturers could likely reduce the
time and resources spent in consultation with the FDA. One could argue, how-
ever, that risk and safety assessment is actually an expertise distinct from and
better understood than that required for recombinant DNA. The FDA might
well be equipped to analyze toxicity and allergenicity data from a substance
without necessarily understanding the bioengineering origins of the product.
Essentially, this issue strikes at the heart of FDA's determination to regulate
genetic engineering via its products rather than its procedures. However, just as
the FDA has adopted what is eectively a process-oriented approach to tradi-
tional hybrids (i.e., foods derived from
59See FDA Complete Consultations on Seven New Biotech Products,
FOOD cHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 21, 1994.
25
25cross-breeding require no special oversight), a partial shift to this type of ap-
proach in the rDNA eld would likely reduce the barriers to entry and expand
the market for genetically engineered foods. Also, an improved understanding
of the specic techniques at work can also allow the FDA to conclude more
quickly that certain procedures achieve results (in terms of protein expression)
substantially equivalent to approved products and therefore new products can
be approved more quickly with no additional safety risk)0 Thus, accumulated
regulatory expertise in this area would also stimulate greater competition for
the benet of consumers.
Fortunately, to date FDA regulation of genetic engineering has not been
driven by the exigencies of addressing a human tragedy due to unsafe or con-
taminated food. While the agency's 1992 policy statement thoroughly examines
a wide variety of scientic knowledge regarding food safety, it has failed to satisfy
many consumer advocates, environmentalists, and others in the public whose
concerns often stem from a lay qualitative perception of the risks of genetic
engineering.bI Thus, some have predicted
305ee id. (three manufacturers are eectively duplicating the Flavr5avr
tomato through other genetic mechanisms with the same phenotypic ex-
pression).
615ee, e.g., FDA Scientic Advisers Ponder Regulation of Bioengineered Food,
FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 14, 1994 (giving examples of consumer ad-
vocate and other interest groups criticizing the current FDA position) . Of
course, some scientists also have been outspoken skeptics of the safety of
genetic engineering. See note 59 (molecular biologist calling for 50-year
moratorium on release of genetically engineered
26
26that mounting public pressure on Congress and the FDA may result in additional
regulatory oversight.62 Given the inevitable consumer demands for additional
sources of novel, nutritious and improved foods, it also seems wise for the FDA to
contemplate the implications of its decisions and regulations on the development
of the food markets,63 even as it continues its traditional role of safeguarding
our food supply.
organisms and returning grant money, because such research is
a.
irresponsible without knowledge of long-term consequences)
~2See Bohrer, supra note 24, at 666.
b3The food industry may be greatly aected by apparently small changes in food
composition. One commentator has predicted that tomato processors can anticipate
savings of $100 million for every one percent increase in the solids content of tomatoes.
See Kunimoto, Commercial Opportunities in Plant Biotechnology for the Food
Industry, Food Tech., Oct. 1986, at 60, cited in Frank, supra note 17, at
179.
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